Click here to return to pinoy coffee blogs


 

Posted on Tuesday, January 06, 2004 - THE MANILA TIMES

  
 

At Customs, corruption is
institutionalized and systematic

 

By Annie Ruth C. Sabangan, Senior Reporter

HE likened the bureau to an institution for the deaf and the blind. It’s actually selective sensory impairment—only when the situation calls for it, said “Mario,” a former official of the Bureau of Customs.

During what he calls “the swing operation,” no one sees and hears the traffic of containers from the bureau’s import warehouse. After the first release of a container of imported goods worth millions of pesos, the same container is again loaded with goods using the same gate pass that covered only the imports earlier released.

“Sometimes, the same container is swung up to five times, without the permits, and with the import fees going not to the government but to someone else’s pocket.”

At another bureau division the name of the game is “pagpag.” Individuals or companies that either complete the requirements for importation or follow up the release of their goods must be apt at knowing how to get things done fast.

“Pag pinagpag ang mga papeles mo at sinabi sayo na kulang at dapat kumpletuhin mo, dapat alam mo ang gagawin mo, says Mario. [If they wag your papers and tell you that you lack other requirements and that you should complete them, you should know what to do.]”

More often than not, the papers are complete. Lacking only is the paper money—which Mario says must be clipped, usually on the second page of the document (and later slid through an open drawer) if one doesn’t want to hear innuendoes like “kasi hindi susulat ang bolpen pag walang tinta [because the ball pen won’t write if it doesn’t have ink].”

Others accustomed to the “Customs’ way” already know what to do: don’t forget Friday, known in the bureau as “Envelope Day.”

“Para hindi maipit ang papel mo at mailabas mo agad ang kargamento, dapat ipitan mo, Mario says. [So that the processing of your documents won’t get slowed down and your cargoes to be released early, you have to tuck money in your papers.]”

Grease money ranges from P300 to P1,000 for each importation document. Mario says that up to 1,000 documents are processed monthly, thus grease money could be between P300,000 and P1 million. The collection, or what Customs people call “dividends,” is divided among the official and his staff  (usually composed of 12 people) in charge of processing import permits either daily or weekly. Mario calculates: “On a daily basis, may siguradong P1,000 ka sa bulsa; pag weekly mga P5,000 o P6,000.”

Even Mario himself, an engineering graduate, admits he got his job through patronage, another form of corruption. Because of his connection with an influential national politician, he was given a good position in what he calls the “scalawags division” of the bureau. “It’s so called because many positions there are created for political accommodation,” he says.  

As in other government agencies, corruption at Customs has become a malady without the cure. It has become a way of life for many officials and employees of the bureau—systematic and institutionalized. 

In fact, no major recent studies on corruption in the government—whether through perception or factual investigation—have excluded the bureau from the list of the most corrupt agencies of the government. In the survey done last year by the Social Weather Stations, the bureau, with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, topped the list. A study by the Asian Development Bank also last year noted that close to 50 percent of the country’s firms regarded the bureau as a moderate to major hindrance to improving the investment climate.

From the Quirino to the Estrada administration, at least 12 presidential antigraft and investigation agencies were established, coupled with various laws to fight corruption.

But the situation proved to be a Catch-22. Corruption became even more ingrained. Every administration’s effort to cure the disease appeared to be just a part of a vicious circle. Worse, the public perception lingers that the ones offering solutions are in fact part of the corruption problem.   

In 2000 the World Bank estimated that in the last 25 years, a total of P1 trillion was lost to corruption. In 2003 Chair Karina David of the Civil Service Commission said the government lost $48 billion, or P2.6 trillion, in the last 20 years due to corrupt practices. At Customs it was alleged that P604 billion from the Aquino to the Ramos administration ended up in private pockets. Former senator Francisco Tatad alleged that in 2003 bonding companies defrauded the government, through Customs, of up to P100 billion in unliquidated export and re-export bonds.

In December the Arroyo administration added another layer to the government’s anticorruption mechanisms. Called the Revenue Integrity Protection Service, the body, which is under the Department of Finance, will guard the integrity of revenue collection at the Bureau of Customs and of Internal Revenue. The Department of Finance estimated that P240 billion in potential revenues is lost yearly to corruption at the two bureaus. 

The ‘deep blue sea’

Activists have bewailed the deluge of imported goods. They rail at the trade imbalance favoring imports, which kills local jobs and industries. But in some ways, the increase in importation enhances the government’s revenue collection.  

Customs revenue, which primarily comes from import tax and duty, represents some 20 percent of the government’s annual total revenue. For the last five years, Customs’ revenue collection averaged P95.8 billion yearly—enough to feed in a year 1.65 million poor families of five members or build 532,000 low-cost houses. 

But the economic benefits could be much greater than that. Some believe that by just lowering the incidence of corruption at Customs alone, not even eradicating it, additional revenue would be enough to answer for a big portion of the entire national budget or drastically reduce the country’s external debt.

“The bureau is like the deep blue sea: it never runs out of water. There is always money, lots of it. Revenue could be doubled or even tripled only if selfishness is not at its extreme,” says an insider who is privy to the bureau’s operations and finances.

Late last year, this insider made a study on Customs records of shipments at the port of Manila in April that were declared abandoned in May. Under the law, abandoned containers are placed in Customs custody, and must be sold at a public auction and become part of government revenue.

Wading through the thick records of abandoned shipments, the insider found out that 99.5 percent of the 2,577 abandoned containers were nowhere at the port. “They just disappeared. No location report was submitted. Only 13 containers were found. If these were auctioned, the proceeds should have been included on the revenue records. But nothing in the records could prove that. Proceeds from the supposed auction were a nonfactor in the revenue collection report of the Customs bureau,” the source said.

If the average cost of every container is P1 million, the insider estimates that the government could have lost P2.6 billion of potential revenues only at the port of Manila in just one month. “Imagine how much we have lost if we go over the yearly records of abandoned records of our 15 ports nationwide. Definitely that would run into tens of billions of pesos,” he says.

The insider concludes that the abandoned containers that disappeared and were auctioned in Customs custody “are meant to be stolen and not to be sold.”

The source said that for lack of quantified records of abandoned, forfeited or overstaying articles in Customs custody, a minimum estimate of 3.5 percent of in-bound shipments worth P54.38 billion becomes Customs property. At 3.5 percent of in-bound shipments, proceeds and thus revenue, based on the source’s calculation, could not be less than P20 billion—enough for the Department of Agrarian Reform to acquire and distribute 80,000 hectares of sugar or coconut lands for farmer beneficiaries or feed an additional 344,708 poor families in a year.

Unfortunately, he says, Customs records will show that annual proceeds from auction sales “are less than P300 million.”

Leaks in revenue collection

The insider explains that leaks in import revenue collection at Customs can generally be found in consumption entries, warehousing entries and the disposition of property in Customs custody discussed earlier.

Common fraudulent practices found in the consumption of import entries are misdeclaration, undervaluation and misclassification.

“Misdeclaration happens, for instance, when imported rice is declared a raw material for rice cake or rice wine, which makes it nondutiable—when in truth it is a finished product that would be sold in the local market and thus should have import duties,” the source said.

Other examples of dutiable products that are declared nondutiable are cellular phones already assembled for sale but declared semiconductor parts, ready-to-wear clothes declared cloth for manufacturing/repair or used clothing for donation that can often be found in the thriving ukay-ukay business.  

Undervaluation happens when the true value of imported rice is $185 for every metric tons but is declared $52 per metric ton. Automatically, owing to undervaluation, import duty would decrease. If the rate of duty for every mt is 0.13 percent, total duties at $185 for every mt should have been $24.05. But the importer would only pay $6.76 worth of duties, or 72 percent lower at $52 for every mt.

Misclassification happens when expensive blankets are declared cheaper handkerchiefs or towels, apples become garlic, shoes become slippers or when completely built cars are declared complete knockdowns.

In the warehousing entries, the insider says, diversion or illegal withdrawal of imported goods usually happens. Imported goods meant for warehousing do not reach the Customs bonded warehouse, because the articles are illegally released and sold in the market. In July 2003, 210 containers of imported rice equivalent to 5,250 mt entered the Philippines. The insider said that the Bureau of Customs reported that the rice was transferred to its two bonded warehouses. In September the National Bureau of Investigation found the rice illegally stocked in a private warehouse in Antipolo City.

The source also observed that for the last 20 years, Customs recorded a 70-to-30 ratio between consumption and warehousing entries. But from January to June of 2003, the ratio had become 58 percent to 42 percent. A 12-percent rise in the warehousing entries indicates that “Customs bonded warehouses are now used as conduits for smuggling,” the insider said.

 

 

TWO years ago Aling Lina’s fruit stand was supplied with 50 kilos of mangoes that earned her P1,500. In 2003 the mango supply increased to 80 kilos, which she sold for a profit of P1,000. This year Aling Lina would be supplied with 100 kilos, which would make her earn only P900.

While the supply of mango increases, Aling Lina’s profit from its sale decreases. Two years ago the profit from a kilo of mango was P30; in 2003 it was P12.50; and this year it would be only P9.

This example of eroding profit in comparison with a continuous increase in supply illustrates the relationship between the revenue collection of the Bureau of Customs and the total value of imports from 1995 to 2002 and from January to September 2003.

Data from the National Statistics Office (NSO) indicate that the Customs collection failed to keep pace with the growing value of imports, thus decreasing the effective tax rate.

In 1995 Customs collected P1 billion for every P7 billion worth of imports. The ratio of collection to the value of imports has so plummeted through the years that in 2002 a P1-billion collection could be made only after every P19 billion worth of imports.

Yearly computations of the ratio between Customs collection and the value of imports show a steady decline in the percentage of revenue to the value of imports.

In 1995 collection was 14.3 percent of the total value of imports. The figure dropped to 12.3 percent in 1996, to 8.9 percent in 1997 and to 6.3 percent in 1998.

Collection increased slightly to 7.2 percent in 1999, but fell to 6.8 percent in 2000 and to 6.4 percent in 2001.

In 2002 the proportion of collection to the value of imports was 5.3 percent, the lowest since 1995. From January to September 2003, preliminary data from the NSO showed that collection represented only 5.2 percent of the total value of imports.

Why import-tax collection has declined

What could explain the decline in import-tax collection as against the growing value of imports? What could have pulled down collection despite rising imports?

Customs collection represents two kinds of revenue: 1) import duties, which consist of tariffs on oil and nonoil products and 2) import tax, which consists of value-added and excise taxes.

Determining the causes of the decline in collection would require a separate analysis of the two kinds of import revenue.

The rates of import duties or tariffs have changed through the years, marked by a downward trend largely caused by the deepening of globalized trade relations.  

At least four factors influenced the fluctuations in the collection of import tariffs and duties:

1) the government’s removal of the special oil levy of 95 centavos a liter;

2) a tariff measure under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which required the shift in the basis of customs valuation from the wholesale price of the commodity in the exporting countries (which would yield higher value of imports and, thus, higher duties) to the transaction value or the actual export price of imports (which yield lower duties);

3) the government’s successive executive orders on tariff cuts that were made under the country’s commitment to the World Trade Organization and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and

4) the growing number of duty-free economic zones to entice foreign investors.

These negative factors accounted for the decrease in the collection of import duties, such that in 2001 import duties stood at P39.5 billion, or 41.1 percent, of the total collection of P96.232 billion. In 2002 the share of import duties to the total collection of P96.251 billion fell to 38.4 percent, or P36.9 billion.

Computing the percentage of import duty to the total value of imports would yield a much lower tax collection based on import duty.

In 2001 only 2.62 percent of import duty was collected from the total import value of P1.507 trillion. In 2002 the tax base decreased to 2.02 percent of the total import value of P1.828 trillion. From January to September 2003, import duty was only 2.1 percent of the P1.509 trillion of import value.

Higher import value, lower import tax collection

On the other hand, the formula for determining the factors that influence the rate of collection based on import tax is different from that for import duties.

It is safe to say that although the rates of import duties depend on the changes in tariff measures, the rates of import tax composed of VAT and excise tax are almost constant or predetermined. With or without changes in tariff measures, revenue from tax imports would correspond to the growth of import value. Thus it could be assumed that the increased value of imports would also increase the collection of revenue based on import tax.

Surprisingly, this relation between the rise in the value of imports and the corresponding increase in import tax was not reflected in the records of the Customs revenue collection. In 2001 only 3.5 percent (P52.938 billion) of the P1.507 trillion of the value of import was recorded as total tax import. In 2002 the value of imports, according to the NSO, rose by 21.3 percent to P1.828 trillion from P1.507 trillion in 2002.

Since the value of imports rose significantly, the valid conclusion is that there would be a corresponding increase in import-tax collection. But what appeared in the records was the opposite: import-tax collection even decreased by 0.3 percent so that in 2002, only P59.252 billion in import tax was collected, or 3.2 percent, of the P1.828 trillion of import value.

$5.28-billion discrepancy

There was a wide discrepancy in the import value records of Customs and the NSO in 2002. Customs records show that the total value of imports for 2002 was $30.147 billion, or P1.555 trillion (based on the average exchange rate of P51.60 to a dollar)—which is lower by $5.28 billion than the NSO’s import value data for the same year.

NSO placed the total value of imports at $35.427 billion, or roughly P1.828 trillion, using the same average exchange rate.

The Times used the NSO data in computing the percentage of import tax to the total value of imports in 2002. The Department of Finance considers NSO statistics the official government data. Assuming that the NSO data reflected the true value of imports for 2002, Customs needs to account for additional taxes for the $5.28-billion import value that did not appear in its records.    

P26 billion in revenue lost in six months

It would be very difficult to explain why despite the increase in the total value of imports, the import tax did not also rise. Is corruption the reason for the inconsistency? It would be easy to say that it is. But until all records are available for a more comprehensive analysis, it is not safe to assume that it is the reason. Corruption is illegal and therefore a covert operation. Expectedly, the books won’t be opened, they would be hidden or destroyed or no books would be available at all, so that corruption would remain untraceable. 

But an inference could be made, which could be near to the truth in uncovering the business of the abuse of public office for private gain. Such was the result of an analysis made by a Customs official on the relationship between Customs’ import value and revenue covering January to June 2003—intended to be used by the Antismuggling Intelligence and Investigation Center to curb the alleged widespread corruption in the bureau.

The analysis indicated that the government could have lost an additional P26 billion in revenue collection for the first six months of 2003 owing to fraudulent practices in the bureau such as smuggling, technical smuggling, undervaluation, misclassification or misdeclaration of imported goods.

The analysis showed that total import value from January to June 2003 was $18.954 billion (P1.023 trillion), of which 57.79 percent, or $10.954 billion (P591.516 billion) worth of imported goods was considered dutiable; the remaining 42.21 percent, or $8 billion (P432 billion), was nondutiable.

The analysis showed, however, that Customs was able to process only $7.407 billion (P399.997 billion) of dutiable import value for the same period, or 48 percent lower than $10.954 billion.

Basing the revenue collection on only $7.407 billion (P399.997 billion) worth of dutiable goods, Customs collected only P53.032 billion from January to June 2003. The Customs official noted that the bureau could have collected P79.65 billion had it been based on the total dutiable import value of $10.954 billion (P591.516 billion).

Whether the $18.954 billion (P1.023 trillion) of total import value—used as the basis for the analysis of the uncollected P26 billion in revenue—is a projection or the actual figure, the figure appears to be near to the total import value recorded by the NSO in the first six months of 2003, which stood at $18.57 billion, or roughly P1.002 trillion, based on the exchange rate of P54 to a dollar.   

(Note: Two weeks ago The Manila Times submitted a set of questions to Customs Commissioner Antonio Bernardo regarding the issues discussed in this report. Since January 5 Mr. Bernardo has not replied to the queries.)

Click here to return to pinoy coffee blogs

Advertisements:


DEVJOBS is the premier site for international development jobs.

see our DEVJOBS website

Advertisements:

Carlos Ani is an international Microfinance Consultant. Visit his consultancy website. Click below.

see our DEVJOBS website

 

This web page was last updated